Final library copy doctoral dissertation robert egan

St Patrick’s College Maynooth TOWARDS A SYNTHETIC ACCOUNT OF SIN THAT MERGES MAGISTERIAL TEACHING AND THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON SIN WITH THE PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS OF BERNARD J. LONERGAN A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Theology in Partial Fulfilment of the Conditions for the Doctoral Degree in Theology by Robert Egan Supervisor: Rev. Dr Pádraig Corkery Maynooth July 2013 In loving memory of Frances Neville CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 1 PART I: CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGIES OF SIN CHAPTER ONE: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON SIN.

Mortal and Venial Sin. Definitions of Sin. Definitions of Mortal and Venial Sin. Scriptural Roots of the Distinction between Mortal and Venial Sin.

Criteria for Discerning Whether a Sin is Mortal or Venial: Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica. Mortal Sin as Negative Fundamental Option: Bernard Häring and Richard Gula. Häring’s Notion of Mortal Sin as Negative Fundamental Option. Gula’s Notion of Mortal Sin as Negative Fundamental Option.

Summary and Analysis. Knowledge of the Good. Knowledge of the Good in Häring: Exposition and Critique. Knowledge of the Good in Gula: Exposition and Critique.

Häring’s Notion of Human Freedom: Exposition and Critique. Gula’s Notion of Human Freedom: Exposition and Critique. Mortal Sin as Conscious and Freely Chosen Act: Germain Grisez and William E. Grisez’s Notion of Mortal Sin.

May’s Notion of Mortal Sin. Summary and Analysis. Knowledge of the Good. Knowledge of the Good in Grisez: Exposition and Critique.

Knowledge of the Good in May: Exposition and Critique. Grisez’s Notion of Human Freedom: Exposition and Critique. May’s Notion of Human Freedom: Exposition and Critique. 76 CHAPTER TWO: MAGISTERIAL TEACHING ON SIN.

The Theology of Sin in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Notions and Definitions of Sin. Knowledge of the Good. Knowledge of the Good.

Pope John Paul II’s Theology of Sin. The Notion of Sin in Reconciliatio et Paenitentia and Veritatis Splendor. Reconciliatio et Paenitentia. Knowledge of the Good.

Sin and Freedom. Conclusion to Section. 124 Conclusion to Chapter. 125 PART II: BERNARD LONERGAN’S CONCEPTION OF SIN CHAPTER THREE: KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM IN INSIGHT’S CONCEPTION OF SIN.

The Notion of Sin. The Morally Obligatory Course of Action. The Virtually Unconditioned. Grasping and Affirming Being.

Grasping and Affirming the Good. The Failure of Free Will. Essential and Effective Freedom. The Intrinsic Intelligibility of the Good.

Background and Method. The Structure of the Good in Insight. Potential, Formal, and Actual Good. Byrne’s Critique of Lonergan’s Argument.

Lonergan’s Argument Compared to Contemporary Theological Discourse on the Good. Lonergan’s Notion of Human Freedom in Insight. The Contingence of the Act of Will. The Contingence of Actuality.

The Spiritual Nature of the Act of Will. Lonergan on Willing the End and Choosing the Means. Lonergan’s Argument Compared to Contemporary Theological Discourse on Freedom. 175 CHAPTER FOUR: KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN FREEDOM IN METHOD IN THEOLOGY’S ACCOUNT OF SIN.

The Notion of Sin. Authenticity and Self-transcendence. Knowledge and Human Freedom in Method in Theology’s Conception of Sin. The Objectivity of Judgements of Value.

The Notion of Value. Judgments of Value. The Problem of Objectivity. Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Judgements of Value.

Intellectual, Moral, and Religious Conversion. Conversion and Value Judgements. Intellectual Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements. Moral Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements.

Religious Conversion as Criterion of the Truth of Value Judgements 204 2. The Notion of Human Freedom. Human Freedom and Authenticity. Conclusion to Section.

214 Conclusion to Chapter. 215 PART III: SYNTHESIS CHAPTER FIVE: A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO SIN. Knowledge and Human Freedom in Theological Reflection on Sin. Is there an Objective Moral Order which is Discernible by Human Beings?.

Propositum: Moral Scepticism. Mackie’s ‘Error Theory’. The ‘Emotivism’ of A. Sed Contra: The Theological Tradition’s Affirmation of the Possibility of Moral Discernment.

Responsio: Drawing on Lonergan to Answer the Objections of Moral Sceptics. Lonergan’s ‘Intrinsic Intelligibility’ Argument vs. Mackie’s Denial of viii Objective Values. Lonergan’s ‘Virtually Unconditioned’ vs.

Ayer’s Unverifiability Theory. Are Human Beings Free to Act Morally?. Ted Honderich’s Deterministic Argument from Common Experience. Implications of Determinism for Ethics and Sin.

Sed Contra: Magisterial Teaching on Human Freedom as a Contrary Thesis to Hard Determinism. Responsio: Drawing on Lonergan to Answer Honderich. Lonergan in Response to Honderich. 269 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I first of all wish to express my gratitude to the supervisor of this thesis, Fr.

Pádraig Corkery, whose advice, enthusiasm, and encouragement helped greatly to make the writing of this thesis a rewarding and enjoyable process. I wish also to thank the Scholarship Board here in Maynooth for the numerous bursaries I have received since embarking on my postgraduate studies. This financial assistance helped greatly in relieving my financial burden, thus helping me to focus on completing my studies. Thanks are due also to Fr.

Raymond Maloney of the Milltown Institute of Philosophy and Theology, for his generous assistance in allowing me to access the Lonergan archives. I also wish to thank Fr. Michael Conway with whom I began my work on Lonergan before deciding to move this study into the area of moral theology. I learned a great deal from Fr.

Conway’s careful scrutiny and honest appraisal of my work. Finally, and above all, my profound gratitude is due to my wife, Angela, who has supported me both financially and emotionally during the completion of this work. x INTRODUCTION Contemporary hamartological treatises usually begin by pointing out that the concept of sin has lost its meaning in the modern world.1 While the causes of this situation are many and varied,2 part of the problem lies in the fact that the basic notions that underlie the concept of sin are themselves problematic. The concept of sin presupposes the existence of an objective moral order, as well as humanity’s ability to apprehend this order.

It also presupposes freedom to choose to act or not to act in accordance with what we have judged to be either morally justifiable or morally reprehensible. These presuppositions, however, are not easily demonstrated, as they involve concepts that require in-depth empirical analysis. Furthermore, the notion of an objective moral order that can be known, and the notion of human freedom are challenged by the counter-notions of moral scepticism and certain forms of determinism. Because of these challenges, it is crucial that a study in the theology of sin demonstrates the rational plausibility of the concept of sin.

Such a study must attempt to establish the possibility of both ethical knowledge and human freedom. The importance of understanding ourselves as beings who are capable of knowing good from evil, and who are capable of freely choosing to do either the former or the latter, is reflected in the teachings of Pope Benedict XVI and his predecessor, Pope John Paul II. Pope Benedict, in his World Youth Day address of 2008, speaks of one form of moral scepticism that has for a long time been denounced in Christian circles, namely, moral relativism.3 In his address, he speaks of the loss of genuine freedom and of self-respect that comes from moral 1 See for example the introductions to the following books: Josef Pieper, The Concept of Sin, trans. 2 Pope Benedict XVI, for example, suggests that the ‘eclipse of God necessarily brings the eclipse of sin.’ See ‘Pope Benedict XVI: The Eclipse of God Leads to a Loss of the Sense of Sin,’ 15 March 2011 [article on-line]; available from www.org/clife/lent/story.php?id=40691; Internet; accessed 17 May 2013.

3 See for example, C. Lewis, ‘The Poison of Subjectivism,’ in Christian Reflections (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1967), 72-81, and C. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (London: Harper Collins, 1999); first published in 1943 by the Oxford University Press. 1 relativism: ‘Relativism, by indiscriminately giving value to practically everything, has made “experience” all important.

Yet experiences, detached from any consideration of what is good or true, can lead, not to a genuine freedom, but to moral or intellectual confusion, to a lowering of standards, to a loss of self-respect, and even to despair.’4 Similarly, in his discussion of personal and social sin in his Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, Pope John Paul II speaks of the denial of a person’s dignity and freedom that comes from a belief in determinism: ‘This truth [that the human person is free] cannot be disregarded, in order to place the blame for individuals’ sins on external factors such as structures, systems or other people. Above all, this would be to deny the person’s dignity and freedom, which are manifested – even though in a negative and disastrous way – also in this responsibility for sin committed.’5 Magisterial teaching and contemporary theologies of sin reflect on the necessity of human knowledge and freedom if a wrongful act is to be considered a sin. Neither, however, has engaged sufficiently with the rational possibility of either objective moral knowledge or the freedom to choose between alternative courses of action. Magisterial documents and contemporary treatises in fundamental moral theology, while dealing in some detail with the issues of ethical knowledge and human freedom before formulating a conception of sin, contain many presuppositions regarding knowledge and freedom.

These presuppositions are based on scripture, and the arguments presented in these works rely heavily on biblical sources and the Church’s theological tradition. In my dissertation I shall develop a synthetic account of sin that examines and takes seriously the theological anthropology provided by the magisterium and contemporary theologians. I shall also attempt to make this account of sin accessible to the more sceptical 4 ‘Benedict XVI on Moral Relativism in His World Youth Day Address,’ July 17 2008 [article on-line]; available from berkleycenter.edu/recourses/quotes/benedict-xvi-on-moral-relativism-in-his-world- youth-day-address; Internet; accessed 17 May 2013. 5 Pope John Paul II, Reconciliatio et Paenitentia (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1984), sec.

2 reader by drawing on the work of the Canadian philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-84). In his works, especially Insight (1957), Lonergan provides solid foundations for the possibility of sin, ethical knowledge, and human freedom. While recent works have dealt with Lonergan’s notion of sin, they have not engaged with the philosophical question of the possibility of sin, or the related questions of the possibility of ethical knowledge and human freedom. For example, Cynthia S.

Crysdale develops a theology of sin using Lonerganian categories, in order to demonstrate the necessity of conversion for authentic moral development in both individuals and communities.6 Eamonn Mulcahy examines aspects of Lonergan’s soteriology. He explores Lonergan’s notion of sin as alienation and dehumanisation, as failure to achieve authentic humanness. He goes on to explore how this evil is transformed into good through what Lonergan terms ‘the law of the cross.’7 My focus, however, is on Lonergan’s demonstration of the possibility of sin, his grounding of the notion of sin in his rationally developed notions of ethical knowledge and human freedom. My dissertation will be divided into three sections.

In the first section I shall offer an exposition and critique of contemporary theologies of sin. This section will be divided into two chapters. In the first chapter I shall examine the work of four theologians who have contributed significantly to the theology of sin: Bernard Häring, Richard Gula, Germain Grisez, and William E. My selection of these particular theologians is designed to indicate the broad spectrum of approaches to moral theology in general.

Häring and Gula represent a primarily inductive approach to moral theology that draws general conclusions about the moral life by observing human experience in its concrete historical contexts. Grisez and May, 6 Cynthia S. Crysdale, ‘Heritage and Discovery: A Framework for Moral Theology,’ Theological Studies 63, no.