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THE AMERICAN WAY OF POSTWAR: POST-WORLD WAR II OCCUPATION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION by WALTER M., University of Virginia, 1988 M. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2010 Abstract The United States Army became the dominant U. government agency for post- World War II occupation planning. Despite President Roosevelt’s own misgivings, shared by several influential members of his Cabinet, the Army nonetheless prevailed in shaping occupation policy in accordance with its understanding and priorities.

The Army’s primacy resulted from its own cultural and organizational imperatives, to include its drive towards professionalization and its acceptance of legalized standards for conflict in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other related factors included the Army’s ability to create coherent internal doctrine, the training and experience of its leaders, the relative weakness of comparative civilian agencies, the real-world experiences of civil affairs in North Africa in 1942-43, and the personality and leadership style of President Roosevelt himself. As a result, the Army created internal training and education, doctrine, and organizations that operated both at the strategic and tactical level to implement military government in accordance with the Army’s institutional understanding. The Army’s planning and implementation of military government in Germany, Austria, and Korea show the effects of the Army’s dominance in planning and implementing the postwar occupations.

Furthermore, in these three occupations (unlike Japan’s), of particular concern were how the Americans interacted with their Soviet counterparts in the occupied territories at the beginning of the Cold War. As these three occupations reveal, American military government in those locations, as well as the actions of the occupants themselves, profoundly shaped American interests in those countries and thus profoundly shaped American policy during the early Cold War. THE AMERICAN WAY OF POSTWAR: POST-WORLD WAR II OCCUPATION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION by WALTER M., University of Virginia, 1988 M. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2000 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2010 Approved by: Major Professor Dr.

Mark Parillo Copyright WALTER M. HUDSON 2010 Abstract The United States Army became the dominant U. government agency for post- World War II occupation planning. Despite President Roosevelt’s own misgivings, shared by several influential members of his Cabinet, the Army nonetheless prevailed in shaping occupation policy in accordance with its understanding and priorities.

The Army’s primacy resulted from its own cultural and organizational imperatives, to include its drive towards professionalization and its acceptance of legalized standards for conflict in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other related factors included the Army’s ability to create coherent internal doctrine, the training and experience of its leaders, the relative weakness of comparative civilian agencies, the real-world experiences of civil affairs in North Africa in 1942-43, and the personality and leadership style of President Roosevelt himself. As a result, the Army created internal training and education, doctrine, and organizations that operated both at the strategic and tactical level to implement military government in accordance with the Army’s institutional understanding. The Army’s planning and implementation of military government in Germany, Austria, and Korea show the effects of the Army’s dominance in planning and implementing the postwar occupations.

Furthermore, in these three occupations (unlike Japan’s), of particular concern were how the Americans interacted with their Soviet counterparts in the occupied territories at the beginning of the Cold War. As these three occupations reveal, American military government in those locations, as well as the actions of the occupants themselves, profoundly shaped American interests in those countries and thus profoundly shaped American policy during the early Cold War. Table of Contents List of Figures. x Chapter 1 - Introduction: The American Army, Strategic Culture, and the Post-World War II Occupations.

1 Chapter 2 - Military Government Planning Prior to 1940. 32 Chapter 3 - Military Government Doctrine, Training, and Organization. 83 Chapter 4 - FDR, Interagency Conflict, and Military Government. 137 Chapter 5 - The Civil Affairs Division: Representing the Army’s Interests in the Interagency and Intergovernmental Arena.

186 Chapter 6 - Planning and Implementing Military Government in Germany, 1943-46. 234 Chapter 7 - Planning and Implementing Military Government in Austria, 1943-1946. 277 Chapter 8 - Planning and Implementing Military Government in Korea, 1943-1946. 385 vi List of Figures Figure 1- Proposed Theater-Level Military Govt.

66 Figure 2- Major General Gullion's Recruitment Letter. 111 Figure 3- Military Government Division, 1943. 114 Figure 4- Office of Provost Marshal General, 1943. 115 Figure 5- Services of Supply/Army Service Forces & Provost Marshal General.

187 Figure 6- War Department Hierarchy Showing Position of Civil Affairs Division. 204 Figure 7- Organization of Civil Affairs Division. 207 Figure 8- Troop Concentrations within Germany per ECLIPSE Plan. 244 Figure 9- Allied Occupation Zones in Germany.

255 Figure 10- Allied Routes of Penetration into Austria. 291 Figure 11- Austrian Zones of Occupation. 292 Figure 12- Units Designated for Occupation Duties in Japan and Korea. 329 Figure 13- The Division of Korea Along the 38th Parallel.

334 vii Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the help and support of the following: my faculty committee, Dr. Mark Parillo, Dr. Brent Maner, Dr. David Stone, and Dr.

I particularly benefited from taking classes from the first three of these scholars and from reading some of the work of the fourth. Sue Zschoche’s Cold War course challenged me to look at the conflict and era in a new way, and Dr. Robert Baumann’s course on military frontiers provided me insights about partitions and zonal divisions during postwar occupations. I also acknowledge in particular my advisor and mentor while attending the U.

Army War College from 2009-2010, Dr. Sommers especially provided me with his time and his prodigious intellect while I researched and wrote this dissertation. James Kievet and Dr. Brent Bankus, also from the Army War College, provided useful comments on my research into the development of the Civil Affairs Division.

Captain Steve Knott’s (USN) Army War College elective on the 1944-45 European Campaign was especially helpful. Colonel Mike MacMahon provided insights into systematic operational design. Colonel Harry Leach provided me key texts on political constructivist theory. Commander Traci Keegan provided me useful information on organizational theory.

Conversations with Dr. Henry Gole were especially useful regarding the interwar years. I also acknowledge the librarians and assistants of the libraries and archives, where I researched, especially Ms. Jane Yates of The Citadel Archives, as well as the librarians and archivists at the U.

Army War College Library and the U. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, PA. I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the mentorship and viii friendship of Colonel Dave Diner in particular, without whom this dissertation could not have been written. Others have provided counsel and friendship, to include seminar mates in classes at Kansas State University and at the U.

Army War College. I acknowledge also the great soldiers and civilians at I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, especially those at the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate there, for their great support. My family has been supportive throughout, especially my father and mother, Colonel (ret. Lastly, and most importantly, I acknowledge my wonderful wife, Laura, to whom this dissertation is dedicated, and our beautiful daughter, Anna Frances.

Both daily bring joy and meaning to my life. ix Dedication To my wife Laura, whom everyday provided me with unwavering love and support while I worked to complete this dissertation. x Chapter 1 - Introduction: The American Army, Strategic Culture, and the Post-World War II Occupations In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States Army became the principal executor of American postwar governance policy throughout the world. It administered the military occupations of not only the defeated Axis powers of Germany and Japan but also of Austria, Korea, and many nations liberated by American military forces in their drives across Europe and the Pacific.

1 Generals such as Lucius Clay in Germany, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Mark Clark in Austria, and John Hodge in Korea presided over occupied territories as American viceroys. And because of these occupational responsibilities, the Army’s influence over American foreign policy in the early Cold War period was profound, though in ways not usually understood. 2 President Roosevelt had deep misgivings about postwar occupations being run by the Army. And Roosevelt was not alone: many within his administration and outside of it opposed such military rule as well.

George Kennan said, “[T]he ruling of distant peoples is not our dish…there are many things we Americans should beware of, and among them is the acceptance of paternalistic responsibility to anyone, be it even in the form of military occupation, if we can possibly avoid it.” 3 Many in the public indicated as such. An article in the October 1943 issue of Harper’s magazine asked: “Somehow the job [postwar occupation] must be done. But why should it be done by the Army? The Army is specialized in destroying enemy armies. Why should it be presumed to be specialized in the most complex and gigantic task of reconstruction the world has ever seen?” 4 Even high ranking officials in the Army were skeptical about the prospect of American soldiers governing vast expanses of territory.

Marshall 1 expressed such concern in a discussion with the chief of the Civil Affairs Division, Major General John Hilldring: Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid of us. They don’t harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the country or the nature of this government…We are completely devoted, we are a member of a priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the Republic. … And I don’t want to permit the enormous corps of military governors that you are in the process of training and that you are going to dispatch all over the world, to damage this high regard in which the professional soldiers in the Army are held by our people, and it could happen … if you don’t understand what you are about. 5 Despite such resistance and skepticism, at war’s end, the Army administered the occupation of both liberated and conquered countries, and that administration would have major implications for the United States in the postwar world.

The literature on the postwar occupations, particularly of Germany and Japan, is vast and deep, ranging from major works of synthesis to monographs on particular topics, but these studies tend to focus on the specific occupation experiences themselves; and they do not connect either backwards in time to reveal how the Army came to those occupations or outwards in scope to reveal how the Army’s particular doctrine, leadership, and implementation of policy had larger foreign policy consequences. 6 There is also a significant body of literature on the high diplomacy of the war years, especially the Allied conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. Undoubtedly, these conferences of the Allied national leaders resulted in many of the key decisions that led to the construction of the postwar world. 7 But these conferences provided broad and often rather unclear guidance that required interpretation by an administrator.

And for the United States, it was the American Army that specifically became the predominant administrator of postwar policy, and as a result not only enacted, but greatly influenced policy outcomes. 2 As the historical evidence indicates, the Army became the dominant US government actor in postwar occupation policy due to a variety of factors and circumstances that go beyond diplomatic documents or even the apparent national interests of the United States.