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ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: FIDES IN JULIUS CAESAR’S BELLUM CIVILE: A STUDY IN ROMAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AT THE CLOSE OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA John Mannix Barry, Doctor of Philosophy, 2005 Dissertation directed by: Professor Arthur M. Eckstein Department of History In this dissertation, we show not only that Julius Caesar depicted his struggle with Pompey and the government of the Roman Republic as politically legitimate, but that he grounded this legitimacy primarily in notions of fides. Fides is a fundamental Roman notion. A man of fides always does the right thing of his own volition, not under pressure.

Such a man might change his mind about what is right, but he would never pursue his private aims at the expense of the public interest. It is crucial at Rome to be seen this way. Caesar wishes to persuade his audience that he has been justified in taking unusual action—action that is outside the law and has not been authorized by the senate or the people—in defense of his claims. Caesar bases his political case on publica fides, that is, on the ideologically deep-rooted Roman notion that concern for the public welfare must be an official’s paramount concern at all times.

It should always take precedence over private and personal interests. My hypothesis in this dissertation is that not just in Caesar’s BC but in the writings of Cicero, publica fides as a notion subsumes not merely the usual, but also some of the unusual actions that may be undertaken by public figures. We can infer from this that unusual, unauthorized, or unprecedented actions may sometimes be seen as legitimate at Rome if the people engaged in the activity are believed to be guided and motivated by publica fides. We show that Caesar defines the major political themes of the BC in 1.

They can be summed up as follows: (1) Caesar’s good fides vs. Pompey’s bad fides; (2) the good fides of Caesar’s friends vs. the bad fides of their Pompeian counterparts during the political crisis of December 50 and January 49 B.; (3) the good fides of Caesar’s friends and commanders vs. the bad fides of their Pompeian counterparts once violence was involved; (4) the impact of both good and bad fides on the respective armies and on the civilian community in each theater of battle.

FIDES IN JULIUS CAESAR’S BELLUM CIVILE: A STUDY IN ROMAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AT THE CLOSE OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA by John Mannix Barry Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2005 Advisory Committee: Professor Arthur M. Eckstein, Chair Professor Saverio Giovacchini Professor Kenneth G. Holum Professor Hayim Lapin Professor Steven Rutledge © Copyright by John Mannix Barry 2005 This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father Thomas William Barry (1922–2005) ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First, I would like to thank my dissertation advisor, Professor Arthur M. I have benefitted tremendously from his advice and innumerable helpful comments on the various drafts of my work.

I would also like to thank the members of my committee: Professor Kenneth Holum, Professor Hayim Lapin, Professor Saverio Giovacchini, and Professor Steven Rutledge. Their insights and suggestions on how this dissertation might be improved are greatly appreciated. But my greatest debt is to my parents. Without their support, I would more than likely not have been able to complete my work.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 1 CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPORTANCE OF FIDES. 12 The Date of Composition of the BC. 17 Other Literary Sources for the Ideology of Fides.

18 Camillus’s Fides, Rome’s Fides. 21 Amicitia Damaged or Broken, Amicitia Restored. 34 Fides and Imago: The Commentariolum Petitionis. 48 Was Caesar’s Fides an Issue in 50/49?.

56 CHAPTER TWO: PUBLICA FIDES IN CAESAR’S RHETORIC, IN POLITICS, AND IN THE SENATE. 61 Ancient Literacy, Caesar’s Audience. 63 Caesar’s Rhetorical Strategy. 66 Examples of Publica Fides in the Work of Valerius Maximus.

88 Publica Fides in Livy, Sallust, and Aulus Gellius: Three Selections. 98 The Fides of the Tribune P. Rutilius Lupus in December 57. 103 The Fides of the Consul-Elect Cn.

Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus in December 57. 115 Violence in the Senate in December 57. 124 Publica Fides in the Egyptian Debates of January 56. 125 CHAPTER THREE: THE FIDES OF THE SENATE AND THE PAUCI IN BC 1.

139 Pompeian Suppression of the Senate on January 1, 49 (BC 1. 140 The Senate under Siege (BC 1. 167 Omnia Divina Humanaque Iura Permiscentur: When Unusual Action Is Righteous. 176 Pompeian Coup D’Etat and Passage of the Senatus Consultum Ultimum (BC 1.

181 The Privati Cum Imperio (BC 1. 185 CHAPTER FOUR: CAESAR’S DIGNITAS, CAESAR’S FIDES. 195 The Connection between Dignitas and Fides. 210 Caesar’s Dignitas and Fides.

224 Caesar’s Dignitas, Pompey’s Amicitia. 246 iv CHAPTER FIVE: CORFINIUM. 261 Fides Fails, Diplomacy Fails. 263 Caesar Finds Support in Italy.

271 Caesar Defines His Causa at Corfinium .23: Caesar’s Fides, Caesar’s Lenitas. 299 Caesar Again Discusses Peace. 305 Caesar at Rome. 316 CHAPTER SIX: FIDES IN A TIME OF WAR.

330 Examples of Fides in Books One and Two. 380 Examples of Fides in Book Three. 390 Greece (The Fides of M. 395 Greece (The Fides of T.

418 APPENDIX I: CAESAR’S DIGNITAS AND POPULAR LIBERTAS. 423 APPENDIX II: LABIENUS’S FIDES IN THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE BG. 438 APPENDIX III: RAAFLAUB, CAESAR, AND THE MASSILIOTES. 454 v INTRODUCTION Communities obey their ideals; and an accidental success fixes an ideal, as an accidental failure blights it.

William James The purpose of this introduction is merely to inform the reader in succinct terms what my subject is, and what my hypothesis is about the subject. Caesar wrote the Bellum Civile for the purpose of justifying for a politically astute audience the unusual action that he took in January 49 B., when he left his Gallic province for the purpose of resisting certain measures that had been undertaken against him by the republican government at Rome.1 The English novelist Anthony Trollope neatly sums up the famous event: Caesar was, so to say, at home north of the Rubicon. He was in his own province, and had all things under his command. But he was forbidden by the laws to enter the territory of Rome proper while he was in command of a Roman province; and therefore, in crossing the Rubicon, he disobeyed the laws, and put himself in opposition to the constituted authorities of the city.2 So far, so good.

Caesar’s position was (for the time being) legal north of the Rubicon, but became illegal the moment that he moved south of it. Therefore he was an outlaw, a rebellious proconsul engaged in armed aggression against the legitimate government of the Roman state. Caesar’s opinion concerning that government (which clearly was that the government was bad), it would seem, could in no way serve to justify 1 That the audience is politically knowledgeable may easily be inferred from the contents of the BC itself. 2 Anthony Trollope, The Commentaries of Caesar, with an introduction by Ruth Roberts (New York: William Blackwood, 1870; reprint, New York: Arno, 1881), 119.

Trollope read Latin fluently. He also wrote a book on Cicero in two volumes. 1 what he did—either in the ancients’ eyes, or ours. It is a widely held belief today that people in politically free societies (for purposes of this discussion, the Roman republic circa 50/49 is counted as a politically free society) may disagree with their governments, but are not supposed to subvert them.

In a free republic, political competitors and citizens alike are supposed to be law-abiding. Political controversies should be resolved non- violently. If they are not, all people in the society suffer. Violence diminishes individual security, political rights usually go by the board, and the republic (in the extreme instance) fails altogether.

Therefore, Caesar can have had no putative right to rebel. He committed high treason when he left his province.3 The case seems open and shut. So why is there a problem? Or is there one? Let us see what more Trollope has to say about Caesar’s action: Of particular interest is his comment about how Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon was perceived at the time: .but offers to treat with him on friendly terms were made by Pompey and his party after he had established himself on the Roman side of the river.4 Trollope grasps an important truth here. Caesar’s action, in fact, was not seen as irrevocable in its consequences at the time, and negotiations to end the crisis were ongoing for weeks after Caesar crossed the Rubicon and left his province.

We are in a position to compare Caesar’s statements and claims in the BC with Cicero’s contemporary observations preserved in his letters. Despite much typical Ciceronian hyperbole and 3 See, for example, Elizabeth Rawson, The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. Henceforth, the abbreviation CAH is used for The Cambridge Ancient History. 2 frequent prognostications of disaster, it is clear that Cicero remained hopeful for several weeks that the crisis could be resolved without irrevocable harm to the republic.

In late January 49, Cicero writes that Caesar’s conditions (for peace) had been accepted (by Pompey and the consuls), with the reservation that Caesar withdraw from the towns he had occupied outside his province.5 If Caesar complied, then they (Pompey, the consuls, Cicero and the rest of the senate) would return to Rome and work the thing out in the senate.6 Cicero still hopes for peace and believes that Caesar is sorry for his madness (Spero posse in praesentia pacem nos habere; nam et illum furoria.7 The next day, Cicero writes that he thinks Caesar will withdraw his forces from the towns he has occupied. He explains that Caesar (if he complies) will win (i., politically) if he is elected consul, and win less invidiously than if he continues down his present path (Vicerit enim, si consul factus erit, et minore scelere vicerit, quam quo ingressus est).8 For our purposes, there are two important points to note. One is that this shows that contemporaries did not perceive Caesar’s unusual action as irrevocable in its consequences. The other is that Cicero is well able to conceive of Caesar being elected legal consul for the next year in a normal election and working within the system to gain his political ends, despite the fact that what Caesar had just done amounted to high 5 See Att.: Id si fecisset, responsum est ad urbem nos redituros esse et rem per senatum confecturos.

Moreover, Cicero evinces no lingering sense of outrage at this, nor does he appear to have particular misgivings about it. It is business as usual. All sins are forgiven. This presents us with a problem, if we evaluate Roman political behavior according to conventional modern notions.

In the modern world, public officials who openly commit treasonable offenses are generally seen as utterly disqualified from public service ever after (if they do not incur the death penalty).9 Such a person would find it difficult, in a functioning democracy, to campaign for public office again, let alone do so just weeks after having committed his offense. Yet despite the fact that Cicero thinks Caesar has been acting disgracefully, he does not appear to feel that Caesar’s unusual action has disqualified him from public service in some indelible way. Nor, indeed, does Caesar himself. Therefore Cicero and Caesar share a thought-world, surprising as this may seem in view of their many differences in politics.

But the main point for us is that it is not our thought-world. This brings us to the point of this dissertation.