Ramaiah dissertation 2017

Determinants of Success and Failure in US Advising of Foreign Militaries, 1945-present Permanent link http://nrs.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:40046562 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.edu/urn-3:HUL.terms-of-use#LAA Share Your Story The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Accessibility Determinants of Success and Failure in US Advising of Foreign Militaries, 1945-present A dissertation presented by Gabrielle Ramaiah to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts May 2017 © 2017 Gabrielle Ramaiah All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Author: Professor Stephen Rosen Gabrielle Ramaiah Determinants of Success and Failure in US Advising of Foreign Militaries, 1945- Present Abstract Military advising is frequently touted as a high-impact, low-cost strategy that allows the United States to achieve its security goals without deploying combat troops.

The US military now considers foreign military advising to be a core competency, and it has become increasingly involved in military advising missions since 2001, a trend most expect to continue well into the future. Remarkably, neither academic scholars nor the policy community has investigated how effective advising actually is or what factors determine success. Both the United States and others have pursued major foreign policy strategies based on this unproven assumption. No wisdom, scholarly or even within the military itself, currently exists about the overall utility of military advisory missions or how to effectively run one.

This dissertation answers both questions and offers insight on how to determine the likelihood of mission success even before the United States becomes involved in a conflict. This dissertation argues that institutional structures and processes in the host military and advisory group drive advisory mission outcomes. Changes in host military effectiveness are driven by an interaction between two independent variables: advisory group and host military institutional structures and processes that promote organizational learning. Advisory missions are more likely to succeed the more both sides adhere to best practices on a set of specific institutional structures and processes that are required for the effective development of a host military.

Drawing on archival documents, Army and joint publications, oral histories, memoirs and 43 interviews with former American military advisors, I investigate how effective US military advising has iii been since 1945 and the factors that separate the successful missions from the ones for which the United States expended blood and treasure without substantially increasing the host military’s combat performance. I illustrate how the institutional structures and processes in both the host military and the advisory group that promote organizational learning result in substantial improvements in the host military’s combat effectiveness at the unit cohesion, tactical, and operational levels. This dissertation focuses on four case studies: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War from 2003-present, and the War in Afghanistan. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………….1 Overview of Advisory Missions……….2 The Learning Cycle………………………………………………………….22 Chapter 2: Explaining Outcomes of Military Advisory Missions ………………………………………….1 Measuring Institutional Structures and Processes in the Advisory Group……………….2 Measuring Institutional Structures and Processes in the Host Military………………….3 Best, Average, and Worst Practices in Institutional Structures and Processes…….4 Measurement of Unit Cohesion……………………………………………………….5 Measurement of Basic Tactical Proficiency…………………………………………….6 Measurement of Proficiency in Complex Operations……………………………….7 Measuring Military Effectiveness……………………………………………………….8 Measuring Change in Military Effectiveness…………………………………………….9 Dependent Variable Outcomes…………………………………………………………46 Figure 2.10 Requirements for Fully Successful Advisory Missions……………………………….11 Institutional Structures and Processes and Advising Outcomes…………………….12 Summary of Hypotheses………………………………………………………………50 Figure 2.13 List of Potential Cases…………………………………………………………………54 Chapter 3: Korea Case Study…………………………………………………………………….1 Advisory Group Institutional Structures and Processes over Time…………………….2 Host Military Institutional Structures and Processes over Time…………………………86 Figure 3.3 Constabulary Unit Cohesion in Phase I…………………………………………………89 Figure 3.4 Korean Military Effectiveness in Phase II………………………………………………93 Figure 3.5 Progress of the Korean War, 1950-1953……………………………………………….6 Korean Military Effectiveness in Phase III…………………………………………….7 Korean Military Effectiveness in Phase IV…………………………………………….8 Summary of Korean and US Institutional Structures and Processes, Part 1.9 Summary of Korean and US Institutional Structures and Processes, Part 2……………103 Chapter 4: Vietnam Case Study……………………………………………………………….1 Total Advisory Strength in 1965……………………………………………………….2 Advisory Group Institutional Structures and Processes Over Time……………………130 Figure 4.3 Host Military Institutional Structures and Processes Over Time……………………….4 ARVN Unit Cohesion Over Time…………………………………………………….5 ARVN Basic Tactics Proficiency Over Time……………………………………….6 ARVN Proficiency in Complex Operations Over Time……………………………….155 Chapter 5: Afghanistan Case Study…………………………………………………………….1 US Troop Levels in Afghanistan Over Time………………………………………….2 Guidelines for Reports……………………………………………………………….3 A Summary of Training for Afghans………………………………………………….4 Advisory Group Institutional Structures and Processes Over Time……………………176 Figure 5.5 Host Military Institutional Structures and Processes………………………………….6 Unit Cohesion in the ANSF………………………………………………………….7 Basic Tactical Proficiency in the ANSF……………………………………………….8 Complex Operational Proficiency in the ANSF……………………………………….9 Improvement in Combat Effectiveness and Institutional Structures and Processes 1.10 Improvement in Combat Effectiveness and Institutional Structures and Processes 2.187 Chapter 6: Iraq Case Study……………………………………………………………………………….1 Advisory Group Structures and Processes…………………………………………….2 Host Military Institutional Structures and Processes………………………………….3 ISF Changes in Combat Effectiveness over Time…………………………………….4 ISF Unit Cohesion over Time…………………………………………………………215 Figure 6.5 ISF Proficiency in Basic Tactics Over Time………………………………………….6 Iraqi Army Territorial Gains from October 2017 to March 2017………………………219 Figure 6.7 ISF Proficiency in Complex Operations Over Time………………………………….1 Measuring Military Effectiveness………………………………………………………224 Figure 7.2 Summary of Findings………………………………………………………………….3 Institutional Structures and Processes and Advising Outcomes…………………….247 vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have been extraordinarily fortunate to receive practical guidance and moral support from a great many people during the course of this project.

I am deeply indebted to my advisors Steve Walt, Steve Rosen, and Beth Simmons, who are responsible for much of what is good about this research. Of course, all remaining errors are my own. For this project I interviewed a number of former US military advisors without whom I could not have completed this project. I am grateful to them both for their service as well as sharing their experiences so enthusiastically and freely with me.

My undergraduate advisors at Dartmouth Bridget Coggins, John Carey, and especially Ben Valentino, who probably shaped my intellectual development more than anyone else, piqued my interest in political science research and inspired me to pursue graduate school. I am especially grateful for my earliest mentors Amelia Williams, Peter Perretti, and Darryl Bayer, whose encouragement taught me to strive for things I thought impossible. I carry their lessons with me and reflect on their influence often. Over the past three years, I worked full time for the Department of Defense while also a full-time dissertation writer, giving me a deeper understanding of evaluating military capabilities and foreign military training from a practical perspective as well as how large bureaucratic institutions function, both of which feature prominently in my research.

I could not have made this arrangement work without the willingness and flexibility of both my advisors and my supervisors. I’m deeply grateful to all of them for enabling me to forge my own path forward, despite how ill-advised they may have believed it to be. My bosses and mentors at the Department of Defense, Major Greg Czyzyk and Matt Pietruszka took a genuine interest in my research and professional development and advocated for me to the best of their ability. I grew intellectually and professional through my job in a way that informed and complemented my research, and this would not have been possible without them and my esteemed colleagues who kept me in good spirits.

After my move to Washington DC, Andrea Jones Berasaluce, Chris Lucas, and Josh and Elyssa Benedikt so generously hosted me during my visits to Cambridge, feigning interest in my research and providing a much needed diversion from the stresses of everyday life. My fellow graduate students Jason Warner, Peter Volberding, and Adam Breuer, did the same, slogging through this processes with me and vii offering moral support and a sounding board for my ideas in study sessions and feeble attempts at study sessions. I received important moral support throughout this research from my close friends Anna Ludlow, Alan Khalaf, and Connie Hu, who see the best in me and keep upbeat through the ups and downs of this research. My husband, Tucker Ward, has my most profound love and gratitude for being an equal partner both in our careers and in life.

He read every draft multiple times, took care of our dogs and household when I needed time to work, and made me truly happy every step of the way. Finally, I dedicate this project to my father, Vaidyanathan Ramaiah, who enabled everything good in my life. I would not have been able to write this dissertation without his commitment to my education despite formidable odds over the years. viii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION The Research Question What determines the success or failure of military advisory missions, and in which areas of host military effectiveness can advisors have the greatest impact? Despite military advising's prominence in policy discussions, the academic literature has not yet addressed the issue, and existing theories on international relations and military effectiveness offer few potential answers.

Moreover, no standard, recognizable, and widely agreed upon term to describe what I call "foreign military advising" currently exists. Therefore, in answering this question, I first begin by explaining what military advising is. I then explore the literature on military effectiveness and organizational learning and discern what these areas can offer this study. Finally, I detail the research design that following chapters will execute.

The United States and regional powers send military advisors abroad in service of key security objectives frequently, believing them to be a low cost and low visibility means of achieving security objectives. Remarkably, neither academic scholars nor the policy community has investigated this claim. Both the United States and others have pursued major foreign policy strategies based on an unproven assumption. No wisdom, scholarly or otherwise, currently exists about the overall utility of military advisory missions or how to run an effective one.

This dissertation answers both questions and offers insight on how to determine the likelihood of mission success before the United States even before it gets involved in a conflict. The US military considers foreign military advising as a core competency, and the scope and number of these missions over the past two centuries affirms the American investment in the practice.1 Since 2001, it has become increasingly involved in military advising missions since, a trend most expect to continue well into the future. Military advising is frequently touted as a high-impact, low-cost strategy, an essential item in the American military toolkit that allows us to develop host military capabilities in lieu of direct US combat involvement. Other countries have made similar choices; Iran has sent as many as 2,000 advisors to train the 1 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.

Government Printing Office, July 2008), IV-2. 1 Syrian government forces in its civil war; while many are likely fighting on the regime's behalf, there is some advising going on.2 Historically, American advisory mission outcomes have run the gamut from resounding success to abject failure. What little discussion exists on this topic has generally focused on the extent and duration of the United States' commitment, cultural and linguistic differences, or building the border security and police forces' capacity in addition to that of the military. The missions in Korea and Vietnam were similar in these respects, as are most American advisory missions.

In both cases, the mission lasted an extended period of time, lacked cultural and political understanding and language skills upon arrival, and advised a range of security organizations. Even so, these missions produced radically different results. Moreover, these variables function more like constants than true variables, changing very little if at all over the course of advisory missions. Moreover, these factors are present in similar degrees across virtually all cases.

They are therefore poorly suited to explain variations over time and across units. What, then, explains whether advisory missions succeed or fail? I. Military Advising in Context This section offers context surrounding the many was that the US military offers instruction to foreign militaries.