Luận án tiến sĩ the role of international agreements in environmental conservati

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY FACULITY OF ECONOMIC --------------------------------------------------------- YASUKATA FUKAHORI THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO VIETNAM Major: Political Economy Code: 62.01 DOCTORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS Advisor: 1. Associated Professor, Doctor Phi Manh Hong 2. Doctor Phung Xuan Nha HaNoi, 2008 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI COLLEGE OF ECONOMIC --------------------------------------------------------- YASUKATA FUKAHORI THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO VIETNAM Major: Political Economy Code: 62.01 DOCTORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS Advisor: 1. Associated Professor, Doctor Phi Manh Hong 2.

Doctor Phung Xuan Nha HaNoi, 2008 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com CONTENTS Page Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter I: Economic Theories Related to Environmental Conservation………. Theories of Common Pool Resources ……………………………………. Theories of Collective Actions and International Agreements ……………. Other Economic Theories …………………………………………….

Application of Economic Theories to Environmental Conservation………. Sustainability and Budget Line – Case Study for Forest Conservation……. Game theory scenarios and possible contribution arrangements of 46 international agreements …………………………………………. Summary of Results ………………………………………………….

90 Chapter II: Environmental Conservation in Relation with Trade, ODA and 92 Sustainable Development ………………………………………….1 Trade Agreements and Environmental Issues …………………………. The New Politics of Trade ………………………………………. Trade under Commodity Agreements and Environmental Conservation…. WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Environmental Conservation.

Global Environmental Issues ………. Issues and Problems related to Global Environmental Conservation………. World Summit for Environment ……………….3 ODA and Environmental Issues …………………………………………. Trade and ODA …………………………………….

ODA and Environmental Issues ……………………. Problem of International Aid ……………………………. 107 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail. The Problem of Sovereignty and Economic Forces ……………………… 110 2.

Capacity Building, Education, and International Treaties …………. Sustainable Management of Environmental Natural Resources ………. Definitions of Sustainable Development …………………………………. Economic growth for local welfare and conservation - Sustainable 112 Development.

Problems Causing Sustainable Management ……………………. Environmental Conservation and International Agreement ………………. International Negotiation on Environmental Conservation ………………. Fund Raising under the Existing International Agreements ……………….

ITTO and Forest Conservation ……………………………………………. Limit in conservation by an international agreement organization ………… 130 2.6 Experiences in Other Countries…………………………………………….3 China ……………………………………………………………………… 133 Chapter III: Issues Related to Vietnam …………………………………………. The New Trade Debate and Its Implication to Vietnam …………………. Vietnam’s New Membership of WTO …………………………………… 137 3.

New Politics of Trade and Vietnam ……………………………………… 138 3. CDM and Vietnam ……………………………………………………….4 ODA and Environment/Trade Issues for Vietnam………………………… 141 3. Application of Economic Theory - Implication of ITTO Mechanisms to 142 Vietnam - …………………………………………………………………. Analysis of results ………………………………………………………… 156 3.

Summary of Games ………………………………………………………. Experiences in Other Countries for the comparison with Vietnam………… 160 3. 160 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail. Lessons from other countries …………………………………………… 161 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………….

162 List of reference materials ……………………………………………………… 168 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com LIST OF FIGURES, BOXES AND TABLES Page Chapter I: Economic Theories Related to Environmental Conservation 15 Figure 1. Supply=Demand Relation for Normal Private Goods 18 Figure 1. Supply=Demand Relation for Public Goods 18 Figure 1. Total Cost and Total Revenue Relation (Private goods) 20 Figure 1.

Marginal Cost and Average Revenue Relation (Private Goods) 20 Figure 1. Total Cost and Total Revenue Relation (Public Goods) 21 Figure 1. Marginal Cost and Average Revenue Relation (Public Goods) 21 Figure 1. Natural Resource Budget Line and Sustainable Level 23 Box 1.

International Agreement and Game Theory 29 Figure 1. Contribution and Depletion Relation 30 Figure 1. Export Quota Allocation and Market 34 Figure 1. Elasticity of Substitution (High Elasticity) 35 Figure 1.

Elasticity of Substitution (Low Elasticity) 35 Figure 1. Current and Possible Future Budget Lines 37 Figure 1. Long-term Tropical Forests Depletion Perspectives 38 Figure 1. The case sustainable level is set at 2000 41 Figure 1.

The case sustainable level is much higher than present level 41 Figure 1. Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion 44 (Case 1) Figure 1. Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion 44 (Case 2) Figure 1. Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion 45 (Case 3) Figure 1.

Relation between Fund and Global Environmental Value 48 / Scenario 1 (Gv = 2*(Cp + Pp) - 1500) Box 1. Contribution to the Fund and Game Theory /Scenario 1 (Gv = 49 2(Cp + Pp) - 1500) TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 53 Box 1. No environmental value for producers 54 Box 1.

Half environmental value for producers 55 Box 1. Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 1b (Gv = 57 2(Cp + Pp) - 1500)&(Pv = Gv - Pp + Cp) Box 1. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 59 Box 1. No environmental value for producers 60 Box 1.

Half environmental value for producers 61 Figure 1. Contribution and Sustainable Level of Depletion (Case 4: Both 63 consumers and producers share responsibility) Figure 1. Budget Line of the Fund 66 Figure 1. Budget Line Shift by Producers' Efforts 66 Figure 1.

Relation between contribution and Global Environmental 68 Value /Scenario 2 (Gv = Cp + Pp) Figure 1. Relation between contribution and Global Environmental 69 Value /Scenario 3 (Gv = Cp + Pp -1500) Box 1. Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 2 (Gv = 71 Cp + Pp) Box 1. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 72 Box 1.

No environmental value for producers 73 Box 1. Half environmental value for producers 74 Box 1. Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 3 (Gv = 75 Cp + Pp -1500) Box 1. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 76 Box 1.

No environmental value for producers 77 Box 1. Half environmental value for producers 78 Box 1. Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 2b (Gv = 80 Cp + Pp)&(Pv = Gv -Pp + Cp) Box 1. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 81 Box 1.

No environmental value for producers 82 Box 1. Half environmental value for producers 83 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail. Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 3b (Gv = 84 Cp + Pp -1500)&(Pv = Gv - Pp + Cp) Box 1. Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 85 Box 1.

No environmental value for producers 86 Box 1. Half environmental value for producers 87 Chapter II: Environmental Conservation and Trade ………………. Developing Countries' Share in Total Exports of Selected 99 Table 2. Total forest area, related land area and population in 1995 120 Table 2.

Forest cover change for developing countries 123 Table 2. Current and projected consumption of forest products 124 (1990-2010) Table 2. Natural forest and Net Plantations in developing countries 125 Table 2.6 Forest cover state and change by ecological zone for tropical 126 countries Chapter III: Issues Related to Vietnam ………………………………. Relation between the Bali Partnership Fund and Vietnam 146 Scenario 1 (GVv = Cp + Vp) Box 3.

Contribution to the Bali Partnership Fund and Game Theory / 147 Scenario 1: Vietam (GVv = Cp + Vp) Box 3. Same environmental value for both Vietnam and consumers 148 Box 3. No environmental value for Vietnam 149 Box 3. Half environmental value for Vietnam 150 Box 3.

Contribution to the Bali Partnership Fund and Game Theory 152 /Scenario 2: Vietnam (GVv = Cp + Vp)&(Vv = GVv -Vp + Cp) Box 3. Same environmental value for both Vietnam and consumers 153 Box 3. No environmental value for Vietnam 154 Box 3. No environmental value for Vietnam 155 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com Abbreviations AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of East Asian Nations ASEM Asia Europe Meeting BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement CDM Clean Development Mechanism CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff COP Conference of the Parties CPR Common Pool Resource CPRGS Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy DDA Doha Development Agenda DSB Dispute Settlement Board FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FCCC Framework Convention on the Climate Change FTA Free Trade Agreement FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GEF General Environmental Facilities GHG Green House Gas ICO International Coffee Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change ITTA International Tropical Timber Agreement ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization MAI.

Multilateral Agreement on Investment MDG Millennium Development Goals MEA Multilateral Environment Agreement TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com MMT Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODA Official Development Aid OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper SOE State Owned Enterprise TED Turtle Excluder Device TPA Trade Promotion Authority UN United Nations UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme USITC United States International Trade Commission WB World Bank WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO Trade Organization WWF World Wildlife Fund TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com December 2007 INTRODUCTION 1. Necessity of the thesis topic Reflecting the growing concerns of global community on rapid depletion of tropical forests, and responding to their determinations stated in Rio Declaration of 1992, governments and people of the global community reinforced their commitments to environmental sustainable society for the offspring of all human beings. Especially, a number of new international agreements are created or renewed to include more environmental conservation oriented clauses. Efforts being made under FCCC (Framework Convention on the Climate Change) and ITTA (International Tropical Timber Agreement) of 1994 are two of the examples.

Organizations such as APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) or WTO (World Trade Organization) also increased concerns on environmental conservation by way of reorganizing trade related measures. It is therefore imperative to study how these international organizations should achieve the sustainable development. Particularly, it is important to study the relations between sustainable development and trade liberalization which these organizations promote in order to increase the economic benefits of global community including developing countries such as Vietnam. General Information on Thesis Study (1) Previous Studies The mechanisms or arrangements adopted by member countries of international agreements can be examined theoretically and scientifically by comparing them with previous economic theories such as those stated below.

In order to examine these theories, mathematical analysis will be employed as a core tool of methodology. Particularly, the paper will try to come up with possible mathematical solutions that are TIEU LUAN MOI download- 1: - skknchat@gmail.com workable even under so-called “prisoners dilemma” under game theories. (a) Theories of Common Pool Resources Since most of the environmental assets are common pool resources, the plight of current tropical forests and each member country's decision making process may be examined in accordance with theories of common pool resources or public goods. (b) Theories of Collective Actions Each member country's contribution to international organizations can be affected by the amount to be contributed from other member countries.

Hence, the mechanisms adopted by international agreements can be examined by the theories of collective actions. (c) Other economic theories Other economic theories relevant to environmental assets, such as theory of monopolistic market, will also be introduced where necessary. In order to verify the adaptability of these theories, an international issue and a local issue will be examined. First, WTO agreements and the Doha Development Agenda will be examined particularly in its relation with global environmental movements.

Secondly, the situation in Vietnam will be examined particularly in relation with environmental conservation efforts in Vietnam in a global context. There have been a number of studies which have led to the theories stated above, thereby making this thesis possible. The following studies are just some of such examples. „Governing the Commons‟ (Elinor Ostrom, 1990) and „Logic of Collective Action‟ (Olson, 1965) are the two most important studies which provides important theoretical basis of this thesis.

(a) Environment White Paper of Japan (Ministry of Environment, 2002) There are a number of documents that raise the concern on the global environmental crisis.